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Half a century ago the First Restatement of Torts introduced the notion
that fraudulently obtained consent to intentional torts is valid consent if
the fraud relates to matters of inducement, i.e., the victim's reason for
consenting. Fraud supposedly vitiates consent only if it relates to the torti-
ous nature of the act. On the surface this distinction has such compelling
logic that many scholars have accepted it without question. This Article
examines those cases which involve fraudulently induced consent to deter-
mine whether any practical basis exists for the rule distinguishing between
fraud in the inducement and fraud in the factum. The examination reveals
that there is no basis for the distinction. Fraud always invalidates consent,
whether the fraud relates to the tortious nature of the act or to matters of
inducement.
This Article will first proceed with a brief discussion of the nature of
consent, the origin and application of the Restatement rule, and the excep-
tions to the rule which limit its application. A detailed analysis of the
cases will follow.
B. The Nature of Consent
Consent is an actual or apparent willingness that certain conduct occur.1
For purposes of civil liability, no wrong occurs to one who is willing that
an interest be invaded. 2 Therefore, lack of consent is an essential element
of most intentional torts.3 Of course, consent is no bar to liability when
the plaintiff consents to one act and the defendant performs an entirely
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. A.A., Lincoln
College, 1963; A.B., Missouri-Columbia, 1965; J.D., 1968.
1. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 892 (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972).
2. W. PnossEa, LAW OF TORTS § 18 (4th ed. 1971).
3. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, Tim LAW OF TORTS § 3.10 (1956); PROSSER, supra
note, 2, § 18; Bohlen, Consent as Affecting Civil Liability for Breaches of the Peace,
24 CoLum. L. REv. 819 (1924); Carpenter, Intentional Invasion of Interest of Per-
sonality, 13 Orm. L. REv. 275, 282 (1934); Comment, Consent in Tort Actions, 3 Mo.
L. REv. 44 (1938); 24 MARQ. L. REv. 108 (1940); 8 OKLA. L. REv. 117, 118 (1955);
e.g., Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 172 Pa. Super. 271, 94 A.2d 74 (1953). However,
some courts have treated the issue as an affirmative defense and have placed the bur-
den of proof on the defendant. 8 OKLA. L. REv. 117, 118 (1955); See, e.g., Sims v.
Alford, 218 Ala. 216, 118 So. 395 (1928).
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different act. For example, consent to one type of surgical operation is no
defense if the defendant performs a different surgical operation.4 In such
cases, there simply is no consent in fact to the defendant's act. A further
application of this principle occurs where the defendant fraudulently places
the plaintiff in a position which enables the defendant to perform an act
without consent." Thus, a defendant might employ false representations
to lure a plaintiff into a jurisdiction so that the plaintiff can be falsely ar-
rested.6 This situation involves fraud, but fraud is not a necessary element
of the plaintiff's case since there is a total absence of consent to the im-
prisonment in any event.7
Actual consent is not required, provided that there is a reasonable mani-
festation of consent.8 This rule encourages individuals to act in response
to free choices made by others.9 Thus, there is no liability for a touching
to which plaintiff apparently agrees, even though he secretly objects' 0 or
lacks the mental capacity to consent." If consent is given because of a
mistake as to the existence of some fact, the consent is valid, provided that
the other party is not aware of the mistake. This is because there has been
a reasonable manifestation of consent on which the defendant may rely.
For example, consent to enter a parcel of land, which is given because the
owner mistakenly thought the parcel had been conveyed to the entrant, is
a valid consent, and no trespass occurs where the entrant also believes
mistakenly that he has acquired title.' 2
4. Hobbs v. Kizer, 236 F. 681 (8th Cir. 1916); Keen v. Coleman, 67 Ga. App.
331, 20 S.E.2d 175 (1942); Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125,
105 N.E. 92 (1914); Nolan v. Kechijian, 75 R.I. 165, 64 A.2d 866 (1949); Samuelson
v. Taylor, 160 Wash. 369, 295 P. 113 (1931); Paulsen v. Gundersen, 218 Wis. 578,
260 N.W. 448 (1935). Additional cases are collected at Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 695
(1957). Similarly, consent to enter land for one purpose is no defense if the defendant
enters for an entirely different purpose. Kent County Agricultural Soc'y v. Ide, 128
Mich. 423, 87 N.W. 369 (1901); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 892A, Comment g,
at 26.
5. Hobbs v. Kizer, 236 F. 681 (8th Cir. 1916); Keen v. Coleman, 67 Ga. App.
311, 20 S.E.2d 175 (1942); Nolan v. Kechijian, 75 R.I. 165, 64 A.2d 866 (1949).
6. But see Wanzer v. Bright, 52 Ill. 35 (1869).
7. State v. Shepard, 7 Conn. 54 (1828); Commonwealth v. Burke, 105 Mass. 376
(1870); Kent County Agricultural Soc'y v. Ide, 128 Mich. 423, 87 N.W. 369 (1901);
Hadden v. People, 25 N.Y. 373 (1862); Samuelson v. Taylor, 160 Wash. 369, 295 P.
113 (1931).
8. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 892(2). See Mansfield, Informed Choice In the
Law of Torts, 22 LA. L. REv. 17 (1961) for an in-depth discussion of the theoretical
basis of this rule.
9. Mansfield, supra note 8.
10. Guarro v. United States, 237 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1956); McQuirk v. State, 84
Ala. 435, 4 So. 775 (1888); Chambless v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. 1, 79 S.W. 577 (1904).
11. Beaven v. Commonwealth, 17 Ky. L. Rptr. 246, 30 S.W. 968 (1865); State v.
Warren, 232 Mo. 185, 134 S.W. 522 (1911).
12. Ashcroft v. Cox, 21 Ky. L. Rptr. 31, 50 S.W. 986 (1899); Shaw v. Mussey, 48
Me. 247 (1860). But see Larrimore v. Homeopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 54 Del. 449, 181
A.2d 573 (1962).
[Vol. 46
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Difficulty arises when a plaintiff consents to a defendant's conduct because
of a mistaken belief which has been fraudulently induced by the defendant.
Suppose the defendant, knowing that he has venereal disease, obtains the
plaintiff's consent to intercourse without informing her that he has the
disease. Should he be liable for battery because he communicated the
disease to the plaintiff? Should the consent be a defense?
C. The Difference Between
Fraud in the Factum and Fraud in the Inducement
Legal writers have accepted the following rule for determining whether
the fraudulently induced mistake will invalidate the consent.13 If the mis-
take relates to the tortious nature of the defendant's acts, then the consent
is invalid. For example, a battery is either a harmful or offensive contact.
If the mistake relates to that which makes a contact either harmful or
offensive, then the consent is invalid. In the venereal disease hypothetical
the consent is invalid because the plaintiff thought she was consenting to
a contact that involved no harm to her person, but because of facts un-
known to her the contact was harmful. It caused her to contract a disease.
The consent is invalid since the defendant knew about her mistake and
took advantage of it.14 As a shorthand expression this situation is often
called fraud in the factum. This type of fraud vitiates consent.15
On the other hand, fraud in the inducement is not supposed to vitiate
consent. Assume the plaintiff consented to intercourse with the defendant
in exchange for a counterfeit twenty-dollar bill. Here, the plaintiff is not
mistaken as to the tortious nature of the act. The mistake relates merely
to a collateral matter, i.e., the plaintiff's reason for consenting to the act.1
13. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 3; F. HARPER, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 44 (1933); W. LA FAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW § 57 (1972); R. PERKINS,
CRIMINAL LAw 964-68 (2d ed. 1969); PROSSER, supra note 2, § 18; Carpenter, supra
note 3, at 285; 23 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1939); 15 Tex. L. Rev. (1937).
14. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 18.
15. The case law clearly supports this result. Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478 (5th
Cir. 1943) (unauthorized operation); State v. Lankford, 29 Del. 594, 102 A. 63 (1917)
(venereal disease); Johnson v. State, 92 Ga. 36, 17 S.E. 974 (1893) (poison concealed
in drink); Commonwealth v. Stratton, 114 Mass. 303 (1873) (drug concealed in food);
State v. Marcks, 140 Mo. 656, 41 S.W. 973 (1897) (dissenting opinion) (venereal
disease); Bolivar v. Monnat, 248 N.Y.S. 722, 232 App. Div. 33 (1931) (harmful drug
concealed in drink); Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920) (venereal
disease); State v. Monroe, 121 N.C. 677, 28 S.E. 547 (1897) (drug concealed in food);
Belcher v. Carter, 13 Ohio App. 2d 113, 234 N.E.2d 311 (1967) (failure to disclose
risk of operation); Karriman v. Orthopedic Clinic, 516 P.2d 534 (Okla. 1973) (failure
to disclose effect of operation; no liability because defendant doctor did not know
that the bad result would occur at the time he obtained consent); McCue v. Klein, 60
Tex. 168 (1883) (dicta) (poison concealed in drink); Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash.
496, 118 P. 629 (1911) (venereal disease); Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215
N.W.2d 9 (1974) (misrepresentation of effect of operation).
16. PROSSR, supra note 2, § 18.
1977]
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Such fraud does not vitiate the consent since the plaintiff knew exactly to
what she was consenting. Therefore, there is no cause of action for battery.
D. Origin of the Rule as Applied to Tort Cases
The principle that fraud in the factum vitiates consent but that fraud
in the inducement does not was introduced to tort law by the First Re-
statement of Torts.17 Prior to that time legal scholars either did not dis-
cuss this issue I or flatly asserted that fraud always invalidates consent 19
without distinguishing between types of fraud. The justification given by
the drafters of the Restatement for the rule is contained in the following
footnote to the first tentative draft of the rules relating to intentional torts:
No decision has held that fraud as to a collateral matter, as defined in
this section, creates liability for an invasion of an interest of personality
which does no substantial harm. This section expresses no opinion as to the
advisability of extending the liability for fraudulent misrepresentations so as
to include such a liability.20
It will be seen shortly that one reason for this apparent dearth of au-
thority is the manipulative nature of the inducement/factun distinction
and the way in which the distinction is applied by the Restatement.
2 1
The Second Restatement recognizes the inducement/factum distinction,
but uses slightly different terminology.22 It provides that consent which
is based upon mistaken belief about the nature of the invasion of the plain-
tiff's interests or about the extent of harm to be expected from the invasion
is invalid, if the mistake was known to the defendant or was induced by
the defendant's misrepresentation. 23 Thus, in the venereal disease example,
the Second Restatement analysis would be that the consent is invalid be-
cause the plaintiff was mistaken as to-the extent of the physical harm that
would result from the contact and because the defendant knew of the mis-
take.24  However, in the case where the prostitute agrees to have inter-
17. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 55, 57 (1934).
18. 1 C. ADDISON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 787 (1881) (discussion of
assault); M. BICELOW, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF TORTS (6th ed. 1869); E. KINKEAD,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1903).
19. ADDISON, supra note 18, § 447 (discussion of trespass to land); F. BURDICK,
THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 84, 317 (3d ed. 1913); H. CHAPIN, LAW OF TORTS § 365, at
115 (1917); F. POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 163, 217 (12th ed. 1923).
20. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 72, Comment at n.1 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1925).
21. See text Part II A infra.
22. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 892B. Tentative Draft No. 18 was approved by
the American Law Institute in 1972. 49 ALI PROCEEDINcS 206-13, 223 (1972). The
reporter stated that the essential distinction was between matters going to the nature of
the invasion and matters that are collateral. The new terminology was designed to
provide a test that could always be applied to make this distinction. Id. at 207.
23. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 892(B)(2).
24. Id. § 892(B), Illustration 5.
[Vol. 46
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course in exchange for counterfeit money, the Second Restatement analysis
would be that no battery has been committed because the consent is
valid.25 There was no mistake as to the extent of the harm to her person,
since none resulted. Moreover, there was no mistake as to the nature of
the interest that was invaded. The plaintiff's legally protected interest was
in being free from harmful or offensive contacts. She knew that she was
consenting to an otherwise offensive contact, and that is what occurred.
Her mistake merely related to her reasons for submitting to the contact.
Mistakes as to such matters of inducement are collateral and do not affect
the validity of the consent.26
E. Exceptions to the Rule That Fraud in the Inducement
Does Not Vitiate Consent
The First Restatement recognized two situations in which fraud in the
inducement would vitiate consent. First, if the plaintiff were fraudulently
induced to permit the defendant to use or to deal with his property,
consent is no defense, and the plaintiff has a cause of action for either
trespass to chattels or conversion. 27 Suppose the plaintiff sells a chattel to
the defendant in exchange for a counterfeit twenty-dollar bill. His consent
to the transfer of possession would be vitiated because of the fraud. There-
fore, he would have been tortiously dispossessed by the defendant 2 and
could maintain an action for trespass to chattels or for conversion. 29 There
was no mistake as to the nature or quality of the defendant's act in accept-
ing possession of the chattel or as to the plaintiff's legally protected interest
in not being dispossessed. Rather, the fraud related purely to a matter of
inducement, i.e., the plaintiff's reason for consenting to the dispossession.
The Second Restatement recognizes this exception, but limits its appli-
cation to cases where the plaintiff is dispossessed.30  As a practical matter,
25. Id. Illustration 9.
26. Id. Comment g.
27. RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, §§ 173, 252. See note 85 infra and accompanying
text.
28. Id. § 221.
29. Id. § 222.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 252A (1965). This rule is well recog-
nized. See HARPER & JAMES, supra note 3, § 2.16; PROSSEn, supra note 2, § 15;
and cases cited in Annot., 95 A.L.R. 615 (1935). Actually, the rule that one can
commit a conversion by fraudulently obtaining possession did not originate as an ex-
ception to the inducement/factum distinction promulgated by the Restatement. It was
a well-established rule long before that distinction was recognized. See Addison, supra
note 18, § 467; BuRDicx, supra note 19, § 424; CHAPIN, supra note 19, § 82.
The early common law recognized a now-obsolete distinction between conversion and
trespass. Trespass would lie for an unlawful taking, including a taking with consent
where the consent was obtained by fraud. Id. §§ 81-82. Conversion would lie only
if the defendant lawfully acquired possession (e.g. by finding) and subsequently exerted
unlawful dominion over the property. Id. § 81. Logically, conversion would not
19771
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the Second Restatement rule is broad enough to cover virtually all trespass
to chattel and conversion cases which involve fraud in the inducement.
Instances in which the defendant gives the plaintiff a counterfeit bill or
perpetrates some other fraud in order to obtain the right to damage the
plaintiff's property, as opposed to -obtaining the right to take possession of
it, are likely to be very rare indeed.
The second exception to the general principle that fraud in the induce-
ment does not vitiate consent is where intended physical harm occurs to
the plaintiff.31 Suppose a surgeon represents to the plaintiff that amputation
of the plaintiff's leg is necessary to save his life. The plaintiff reluctantly
agrees to the operation. After the operation, the plaintiff learns that the
amputation was totally unnecessary. The doctor made this misrepresenta-
tion solely because he wanted the fee. Here, the plaintiff was not mistaken
about the nature or quality of the act, the interest invaded, or the extent
of physical harm likely to result from the conduct. His mistake related
purely to a matter of inducement, i.e., his motivation for consenting to the
operation. Yet, fraud clearly vitiates the consent in this case.3 2 A contrary
result is unthinkable, and there is no authority to support the proposition
that fraud in the inducement does not vitiate the consent in this situation.,,
It is not dear whether the Second Restatement recognizes the second
exception. A comparison of both Restatements points out the ambiguity.
The scheme of the First Restatement was to discuss the defense of consent
separately for each intentional tort. Sections 49 through 62 discuss the
defense with respect to battery. The scheme of the Second Restatement
lie if the original taking was unlawful. However, the remedy evolved to the point
where it became broad enough to encompass some trespassory takings, including a taking
with consent where the consent was obtained by fraud. Id. § 82. Thus, the rule,
as it developed, had nothing to do with consent. Instead, it related to the nature of
the tort of conversion.
31. RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § 13, 57 Comment b.
32. Gunder v. Tibbitts, 153 Ind. 591, 55 N.E. 762 (1899); HARPER & JAMES, supra
note 3, § 3.10; Comment, Abolition of Breach of Promise in Wisconsin-Scope and
Constitutionality, 43 MARQ. L. REv. 341, 353 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Abolition of
Breach of Promise].
33. During the early period of the common law when the distinction between tres-
pass and trespass on the case was rigidly enforced, cases involving consent obtained by
fraud or duress had to be brought on the case rather than in trespass. Cadwell v.
Farrell, 28 III. 438 (1862). This was because actual force was essential for trespass.
KINKEAD, supra note 18, § 190, at 438. Such force is missing when the victim con-
sents. C. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW, ch. 9, at 185 (1970).
Such distinctions are no longer made because the requirement of actual violence has
been eliminated, and the distinction between trespass and case has been abolished.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § 13, Comment h. These early cases dealing with the
propriety of a particular form of action are not authority for the rule distinguishing
between fraud in the factum and fraud in the inducement. The presence of either type
of fraud would render trespass on the case the appropriate form of action since the
essential element of force is missing. See notes 61-65 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 46
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is to have one main section discussing consent generally. This is done in
section 892 and sections 892A through 892D of tentative draft 18. The
sections which, in Restatement First, stated the black letter rules of consent
with respect to each tort contain, in the Second Restatement, a cross-refer-
ence to the appropriate general provision. However, these carried-over
sections still contain comments and illustrations of how the consent rules
apply to the specifie torts with which they deal. Illustrations 2 and 3 of
section 57 of the Second Restatement are taken directly from section 57
of the Restatement First. They clearly recognize that fraud in the induce-
ment vitiates consent when physical harm results. However, the black
letter law of section 57 of the Second Restatement is a mere reference to
section 892B (2). This latter section discusses consent given under mistake
or misrepresentation generally but does not recognize the exception. Thus,
if the rule of section 892B were applied literally to the above example,
the surgeon would not be liable for battery. It is possible that the failure
to include this exception in section 892B was an oversight. The drafters
of this section gave no indication in the note to the Institute, in the com-
ments to the section, in the appendix to the section, or in the ALI proceed-
ings where the section was approved,3 4 of an intention to change the rule.
The drafters cite no authority for the proposition that fraud in the induce-
ment does not vitiate consent where physical harm results to the victim.
In fact, they do not discuss this particular issue.
II. CASE LAW SUPPORT FOR THE RESTATEMENT DIsrn. r N
The first exception to the Restatement rule, that fraud in the inducement
does not vitiate consent, excludes application of the rule to most conversion
and trespass to chattel cases. The second exception excludes application
of the rule to batteries which involve physical harm. Therefore, the sup-
posed general rule, as a practical matter, is limited exclusively to contacts
which are actionable as batteries solely because the contact is offensive.85
The courts have never expressly recognized any distinction between fraud
in the factum and fraud in the inducement in deciding tort cases of the
type under consideration. 6 The rule has merely been offered as an ex-
planation of what the courts have in fact done. A careful examination of
the case law reveals that there simply is no support for the supposed rule.
Consent procured by fraud is never valid, even where the fraud relates
purely to matters of inducement. For fraud to be present there must be
a misrepresentation of a material fact or an affirmative concealment of a
34. 49 ALI PROCEEDINGs 206-13, 223 (1972).
35. No authority other than the Second Restatement suggests that the inducement/
factum distinction applies to trespass to land cases. Therefore, these cases are discussed
in a separate section. See text Part II B infra.
36. See note 150 infra for a discussion of situations where the distinction has pur-
portedly been recognized.
1977]
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material fact.s 7  Failure to disclose a material fact is fraudulent only if
special circumstances justify a disclosure.-"
To be sure, there are many cases involving fraudulently obtained consent
in which the plaintiff is barred from recovery. However, these decisions
are not made on the basis that the. plaintiff's consent is valid, but rather on
the basis that even though the consent is invalid, the plaintiff may not
recover for some other reason. For example, there may be a failure of
proof with respect to some other essential element of the cause of action, 9
or the plaintiff may be barred from recovery because of a policy unrelated
to consent.
40
The relevance of criminal cases to this discussion should be noted. Con-
sent of the parties is not a defense to the commission of most crimes be-
cause the public interest in suppressing antisocial conduct is distinct from
the interest of the victim in freedom from invasions of his personal rights.4 1
However, there are some crimes, such as kidnapping and rape, where the
absence of the victim's consent is an essential element of the crime. Here,
no crime occurs if the victim consents.42  In such cases, the question of
whether fraudulently procured consent is valid is similar to the question
presented in analogous tort cases. Criminal law writers have tried to ex-
plain these cases by using the same fraud-in-the-factum versus fraud-in-
the-inducement distinction discussed above.48 The First Restatement of
Torts apparently borrowed the "ruld' from the criminal writers. 44 Tort
writers and the Restatement have freely cited criminal cases in support of
37. RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § 525; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538
(Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966).
39. E.g., cases cited in note 64 infra.
40. See text Part II C infra.
41. LA FAVE & SCOTT, supra note 13, § 57; Beale, Consent in the Criminal Law, 8
HART. L. Rxv. 317, 323-25 (1895); Bohlen, supra note 3, at 820; Puttkammer, Consent
in Criminal Assault, 19 ILL. L. REV. 617 (1925); 47 IOWA L. REv. 1122, 1127 (1962);
4 WAYNE L. REv. 175 (1958). The majority of courts in civil cases follow an anal-
ogous rule. Consent to a crime which constitutes a breach of the peace is no defense
to a civil action for personal injury. Bohlen, supra note 3, at 821. The theory is that
the civil action will deter defendants from committing such crimes. PRossER, supra
note 2, § 18.
42. LA FAVE & SCOTT, supra note 13, § 57; Beale, supra note 41, at 323; Putt-
kammer, supra note 41, at 617; Note, Consent as a Defense to Crimes Against the
Person, 54 DICK. L. REv. 186, 191-92 (1962); 4 WAYNE L. REV. 175 (1958).' Criminal
battery can fall under either rule. Consent is no defense if serious harm or a breach
of the peace is involved. LA FAVE & SCOTT, supra note 13, § 81, at 608; Bohlen, supra
note 3, at 820. It is an excuse where such factors are not present, e.g., a sexual
touching between consenting adults is not an indecent assault. See, e.g., Guarro v.
United States, 237 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
43. LA FAVE & SCOTT, supra-note 13, § 57; PERKINS, supra note 13, at 964-68.
44. Winfield, The Restatement of the Law of Torts-Intentional Harms, 12 N.Y.U.
L.Q. 557, 563 (1935).
[Vol. 46
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the rule 45 on the theory that the rule is identical in both cases.. An under-
standing of the problem, therefore, requires a consideration of the relevant
criminal cases as well as the civil cases. Actually the criminal cases also
do not support the supposed distinction. In comparing the cases it must
be kept in mind that the basic policy underlying a given criminal statute
may be vastly different from the policy underlying a superficially analogous
civil cause of action. This difference in policy may justify a difference in
treatment, depending on the circumstances of the particular case.46
Cases raising the issue of "informed consent" to medical treatment also
may be relevant to this discussion. The issue arises when a person consents
to medical treatment not knowing of a risk of some harm which possibly may
result from the procedure. One line of cases holds that a battery occurs
if an unfortunate result materializes, and the plaintiff did not know about
the risk at the time of consent.47  The other line of cases holds that failure
to inform of a mere risk of harm (as opposed to a harm that. is certain to
result) will not invalidate consent. The doctor is liable, if at all, for negli-
gence in failing to make reasonable disclosure in view of all the circum-
stances.48  This latter line of cases is not pertinent to our discussion since
the doctor's conduct, even if wrongful, does not result in a battery. Instead,
he is liable for malpractice. Assumption of the risk, rather than consent,
is the appropriate defense to such an action. This article is concerned
only with the first line of cases, where lack of an informed consent can
result in a cause of action for battery. Such cases are relevant if the doctor
has fraudulently induced the mistake.
A. Batteries Involving Purely Offensive Touchings
A detailed analysis of the cases reveals the illusory nature of the fraud-
in-the-factum versus fraud-in-the-inducement distinction. As mentioned
previously,49 in civil cases the supposed distinction, as a practical matter,
applies only to batteries involving offensive contacts. Where consent to
such a contact has been obtained fraudulently, it is usually as easy to char-
acterize the case as involving fraud in the factum as it is to characterize it
as involving fraud in the inducement. Bartell v. State 5 0 is a good illustra-
45. E.g., cases cited after § 892B of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Tent.
Draft No. 18, 1972).
46. E.g., notes 145-52 infra and accompanying text.
47. E.g., Belcher v. Carter, 13 Ohio App. 2d 113, 234 N.E.2d 311 (1967); Comment,
Informed Consent After Cobbs-Has the Patient -Been Forgotten, 10 SAN Dmco L. REv.
913, 917-18 (1973).
48. E.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1 (1972)
(en banc); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 892B, Comment i; Kessenick & Mankin,
Medical Malpractice: The Right to be Informed, 8 U.S.F.L. REv. 261, 264 (1973).
49. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
50. 106 Wis. 342, 82 N.W. 142 (1900).
1977]
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tion. The defendant claimed to be a magnetic healer, whose treatments
took the form of massages. After being employed to help an eighteen-year-
old girl overcome a nervous problem, the defendant had the victim remove
all of her clothing. In the course of the massage, he took indecent liberties
with her person. He was convicted of a criminal assault and battery upon
a finding that he performed the acts for sexual purposes.
Professor Perkins has characterized this as a case of fraud in the induce-
ment.51 The theory is that the victim knew precisely what was happening
to her person. Her mistake related merely to the reason for submitting to
the touching, since she thought that it would cure her ailment. Alterna-
tively, it can be just as easily argued that the case involved fraud in factum.
The Second Restatement of Torts analyzes the case this way.5 2 The theory
is that under normal circumstances the touching which occurred in the
Bartell case would be offensive to a reasonable sense of dignity, but if the
touching was necessary for the proper purpose of curing a disease, a rea-
sonable person would not find it offensive.5 3 Thus, a breast examination
by a doctor for medical purposes is not offensive, but the same touching
by a doctor for sexual purposes is offensive. Under this analysis the Bartell
case involves fraud in factum because the victim's mistake related to the
interest that was being invaded, i.e., freedom from offensive touchings.
She thought that she was consenting to a nonoffensive touching. She later
discovered that the touching was offensive. It is true that she was not
offended at the time of the touching but only later upon discovery of the
true motive of the defendant. However, this should be no obstacle to
recovery. The Restatement does not require the victim of an offensive
touching to even be aware of the contact itself at the time it is inflicted
in order to have a cause of action for battery. 4 For example, the victim
of an indecent touching, occurring while she is unconscious, has a cause
of action for battery when she later learns of the touching.5
Bartell v. State56 did not deal with the question of whether the fraud re-
lated to matters of inducement or to the tortious nature of the defendant's
act. The court simply upheld the defendant's conviction because he need-
lessly performed the indecent act for sexual purposes and because the victim
51. PEnKrNs, supra note 13, at 967-68.
52. RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, § 55, Illustration 4. In this Illustration a genuine
physician is held liable for inducing his patient to expose her person unnecessarily. The
Bartell case is cited in support of the illustration. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
Appendix, § 55, at 65 (1966). In illustration 7 of REsTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 892B
a defendant is held liable for inducing the plaintiff to remove her clothing by falsely
impersonating a physician. The notes following section 892B state that the illustration is
taken from the Bartell case.
53. RESTATEmENT, supra note 30, § 55, Comment b, Illustration 4.
54. Id. § 18, Comment d.
55. Id. § 18, Illustration 1.
56. 106 Wis. 342, 82 N.W. 142 (1900).
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consented to the treatment out of ignorance. Subsequent cases have followed
the approach taken in Bartell.57
Ironically, the First Restatement of Torts, the originator of the inducement/
factum distinction, characterized this type of fact situation in both ways.
Section 55 deals with mistakes as to the harmful or offensive nature of the
contact. Comment b provides that an otherwise offensive contact can be
deprived of its offensive quality if it is necessary for some proper purpose,
such as to cure a disease. In Illustration 4 a physician induces a patient
to expose her person unnecessarily by representing that it is necessary for
a thorough diagnosis. He becomes liable to the patient for battery when
he assists her in undressing. The fraud vitiates consent because it relates
to the offensive nature of the contact. On the other hand, section 57 deals
with fraudulently induced mistakes as to collateral matters. Comment a
provides that a mistake as to a collateral matter is one which does not affect
the plaintiff's realization of the nature of the invasion. Rather, it leads
him to consent to an invasion, whose nature he fully comprehends, because
he believes that it is to his advantage to consent. In Illustration 3 a surgeon
induces a patient to submit to a treatment of his eyes by misrepresenting
that the treatment will cure his vision. The doctor's sole purpose in making
the representation is to obtain a fee. If the treatment involves no pain or
physical harm, the physician is not liable to the patient.
The two illustrations cannot be reconciled. They both involve nonbarm-
ful touchings, consented to because of the belief that the touchings were
necessary medical treatment. Identical touchings performed by persons
who were not doctors would have been objectively offensive in both cases.
Nevertheless, sections 55 and 57 of the Second Restatement have retained
these apparently conflicting illustrations.5 8
57. Consent to a touching for sexual purposes is no defense if the doctor represented
that the touching was necessary medical treatment and if the patient believed him.
Commonwealth v. Goldenberg, 338 Mass. 377, 155 N.E.2d 187 (1959), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 1001 (1959) (intercourse; defendant held not guilty of rape because the
essential element of force was missing; the court recognized that he was guilty of
assault and battery); Roy v. Hartogs, 81 Misc. 2d 501, 366 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Civ. Ct.
1975) (intercourse); State v. Nash, 109 N.C. 824, 13 S.E. 874 (1891) (assault with
intent to commit rape). The following cases state that the defendant is not guilty of
rape because the element of force is missing. Walter v. People, 50 Barb. 144 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. 1867); Don Moran v. People, 25 Mich. 355 (1872). See notes 60-65 & 138-44
infra and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue. See also Pomeroy v. State,
94 Ind. 96 (1883) (intercourse without victim's knowledge under guise of medical
treatment).
Also, where the defendant impersonates a doctor for the purpose of obtaining consent
to an intimate touching of the plaintiff's person, which would have otherwise been a
proper medical examination, the defendant is liable if the plaintiff submitted because
of the belief that the defendant was a doctor. Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co. of
America, 243 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1957); Boyett v. State, 42 Ala. App. 220, 159 So. 2d
628 (1964); Commonwealth v. Gregory, 132 Pa. Super. 507, A.2d 501 (1938).
58. RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, § 55, Illustration 4 and § 57, Illustration 3.
1977]
HeinOnline  -- 46 U. Cin. L. Rev. 81 1977
CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
As has been seen, application of the Restatement approach can produce
contrary results in the Bartell v. State type of case with equal facility. The
result is so easily manipulated because of the Restatement concept of the
nature of a battery. The theory is that not every unauthorized intentional
touching constitutes a battery. A contact is tortious only if it is either
harmful or offensive or both. 59 If the arm of a pedestrian in a crowd
brushes against the arm of another pedestrian, no tort occurs because the
touching is not harmful or offensive. 0 There may be implied consent to
many such touchings, but logically there is no battery even in the absence
of consent since this type of touching can never qualify as a battery. For
purposes of this Article such contacts shall be referred to as innocuous
touchings, as opposed to harmful or offensive touchings.
The concept of the innocuous touching is used impliedly by the Restate-
ment in applying its fraud rules in the following way. Suppose the defen-
dant makes a misrepresentation which leads the plaintiff to believe that the
touching to which he is consenting is innocuous, whereas in reality it is
offensive. This constitutes fraud in the factum which vitiates the consent.
To use the terminology of the First Restatement, the fraud relates to the
offensive nature of the act, i.e., that which makes the conduct tortious. In
the context of the hypothetical, the plaintiff thought that he was consenting
to something that was not a tort (an innocuous contact) whereas the con-
tact that occurred was a tort (an offensive touching). To use the termin-
ology of the Second Restatement, the plaintiff was mistaken as to the nature
of the interest that was invaded, i.e., the plaintiff thought that he was con-
senting to a touching that invaded no legally protected interest (freedom
from innocuous touchings), whereas his interest in being free from offensive
touchings was invaded. Because of the Restatement concept that the true
identity of the defendant or the true motive of the defendant can determine
whether a given contact is offensive or innocuous, the result is easily manipu-
lated.61 Thus, a touching by a doctor for medical purposes is innocuous,
but the same touching for sexual purposes is offensive. Likewise, a touch-
ing by a layman, pretending to be a doctor, is offensive even though the
same touching by a real doctor for medical reasons would be innocuous.
Because this- reasoning is not limited to medical cases, the logic of the Re-
statement can be applied to virtually any case allegedly constituting a
battery solely because the touching involved is offensive.
A different fact situation illustrating this point is where the defendant
obtains plaintiff's consent to intercourse by impersonating her husband.
This can be characterized as fraud in the inducement.6 2 The plaintiff and
the defendant have the same physical act in mind; the plaintiff's mistake as
59. Id. §§ 13, 18.
60. Id. §§ 15 and 19.
61. Id. § 55, Comment b.
62. PERINS, supra note 13, at 966.
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to the identity of the defendant merely relates to her reason for giving con-
sent. The case also can be characterized as fraud in the factum. 63  Inter-
course with a stranger constitutes an offensive touching, but intercourse
with one's husband does not. Therefore, the defendant's identity relates to
the tortious nature of the act. Most cases of this type have involved crim-
inal charges of rape under statutes in which actual force is an element of
the crime. The cases hold that the crime of rape was not committed be-
cause this essential element is missing.6 4 However, courts recognize that
the fraudulently induced consent was invalid.65 The defendant is still guilty
of the lesser included offense of criminal battery since actual force is not
required for that crime.66
A closely related situation arises when the defendant obtains the plaintiff's
consent to sexual intercourse by falsely representing that he will marry her.
In this situation a number of courts have recognized a civil cause of action
for seduction.6 7 Proof of intercourse alone is not sufficient because consent
is a defense. Such consent is held invalid when it is obtained because of
a fraudulent misrepresentation of intent to marry. 68
These cases cannot be reconciled with the Restatement rule. One can
argue that sexual intercourse between persons who are engaged to be
63. Id. at 966.
64. Lewis v. State, 30 Ala. 54 (1857); Pleasant v. State, 13 Ark. 360 (1853)
(dictum); State v. Lung, 21 Nev. 209, 28 P. 235 (1891) (dictum); Commonwealth v.
Duchnicz, 42 Pa. County Ct. 651 (1914), rev'd on other grounds, 59 Pa. Super. 527
(1915); Commonwealth v. Childs, 2 Pitts. Rep. 391 (1863) (dictum); State v. Brooks,
76 N.C. 1 (1877); Wyatt v. State, 32 Tenn. 394 (1852); Hortensius, The Pall Mall
Gazette Exposures and the Law of Consent in Criminal Cases, 19 AM. L. REV. 833, 857-
58 (1885); Puttkammer, supra note 41, at 415. See notes 138-44 infra and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of the history of the force requirement in rape cases. The
following cases indicate in dictum that the defendant can commit rape by impersonating
the victim's husband: People v. Crosswell, 13 Mich. 427 (1865); Whittaker v. State,
50 Wis. 518, 7 N.W. 431 (1880).
65. Bloodworth v. State, 65 Tenn. 614 (1872).
66. Commonwealth v. Goldenberg, 338 Mass. 377, 155 N.E.2d 187 (1959), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 1001 (1959).
A similar analysis is warranted in situations where the defendant leads the plaintiff
to believe that they are married by going through a bogus marriage ceremony, State v.
Murphy, 6 Ala. 765 (1844), Bloodworth v. State, 65 Tenn. 614 (1872), or by going
through a genuine marriage ceremony without notifying the plaintiff that the defendant
is legally disqualified from marrying, and thus that the ceremony has no legal effect, cf.
Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434 (1868) (fraud cause of action); Lawyer v. Fritcher,
7 N.Y.S. 909 (Sup. Ct. Gen. T. .1889) (seduction cause of action given to parents.)
67. Hutchins v. Day, 269 N.C. 607, 153 S.E.2d 132 (1967); Slawek v. Stroh, 62
Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974); cf. Lawyer v. Fritcher, 7 N.Y.S. 909 (Sup. Ct. Gen.
T. 1889) (father denied recovery against suitor of daughter who poisoned herself after
being informed he could not marry her.)
68. See cases cited note 67 supra. But see Boedges v. Dinges, 428 S.W.2d 930
(Mo. Ct. App. 1968) (recognizing a cause of action notwithstanding an apparently
valid consent.)
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married is not offensive but that intercourse with a person who does not
have such a relationship with the plaintiff is offensive; therefore, the case
involves fraud in the factum because the plaintiff's mistake relates to the
tortious nature of the act.69 This reasoning is fallacious because the cause
of action is for seduction rather than for battery. Unlike battery, the seduc-
tion action does not distinguish between offensive touchings on the one
hand and innocuous touchings on the other hand. Any act of intercourse,
whether offensive or not, is actionable if there is no consent. Therefore,
there is no mistake as to that which makes the act tortious. The fraud is
purely a matter of inducement, i.e., the victim's reason for consenting.
One step beyond the above situation is the case where the prostitute
submits to sexual intercourse in exchange for a counterfeit twenty-dollar
bill and seeks to maintain an action for battery. Even though such a case
has never arisen, this is the "imaginary horrible" which is used as the major
justification for the rule which distinguishes between fraud in the factum
and fraud in the inducement.7 ° This is said to be a clear case of fraud in
the inducement because the prostitute fully understands the nature of the
act and is mistaken only with respect to her reason for submitting. The
case can also be characterized as involving fraud in the factum. To her,
sex with a paying customer in the course of her business might not be in
the least bit offensive, but sex with a stranger who has cheated her is
offensive.
However, a fraud in the factum characterization is more diflcult to make
in the prostitute case than in the other cases discussed, because a battery
requires an objectively offensive touching.7' It can be argued that sex
with a stranger is objectively offensive whether he pays or not. Since the
prostitute knew she was consenting to an objectively offensive touching, her
mistake related solely to matters of inducement. However, even if this
argument is accepted, valid consent still could not be the basis of the deci-
sion. The consent is invalid for another reason. The Restatement recog-
nizes that a conditional consent is effective only within the limits of the
condition.72  If consent is granted upon the condition that it shall take
effect only upon the happening of a particular event or if the defendant
does a certain act, then the consent is not effective until the condition has
been met. 78 If the prostitute consents to intercourse subject to the condition
that the defendant pay her twenty dollars, and he gives her a counterfeit
twenty-dollar bill, the conduct is not privileged by virtue of the consent
because the condition has not been met.
69. Abolition of Breach of Promise, supra note 32.
70. RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § 57, Illustration 1; RESTATEMENT, supra note 1,
§ 892B, Illustration 9; PROSSER, supra note 2, § 18, at 105.
71. RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, § 19.
72. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 892A.
73. Id. Comment f.
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The best explanation for why the prostitute cannot recover has nothing to
do with the presence or absence of consent. She cannot recover because
of the fundamental common law principle that one may not profit from
one's own wrong.7 4 This is why most common law courts did not give a
woman a cause of action for her own seduction. Adultery and fornication
were crimes, and the female was not permitted to complain of a wrong
which she helped produce. 75 The cause of action, if recognized at all, was
given to the parent or spouse on the theory that there was an agency between
that person and the seduced female, and that the seduction impaired the
value of her services.7 6 Several jurisdictions now grant a cause of action
to the seduced female.77  But where the plaintiff consents to intercourse
because of a promise of financial support, rather than a false promise to
marry, she cannot recover. 78  This decision is not based on her consent but
rather on a public policy which prevents courts from helping her gain such
an award for her own wrongdoing.7 9
The Restatement cites only two cases in support of the proposition that
fraud in the inducement does not vitiate consent.8 0 The first is Oberlin v.
Upson."' Plaintiff consented to intercourse with defendant because of his
promise of marriage. She bore a child as a result of the affair, and brought
suit for physical and mental pain and suffering and for hospital expenses.
The court held that plaintiff could not sue for her own seduction because
adultery and fornication are crimes and that she cannot complain of a wrong
she helped produce. This case hardly supports the Restatement test since
the basis of the holding is public policy rather than consent. It is not even
clear that the case involved fraud because the defendant may have intended
to fulfill his promise at the time of the intercourse. Furthermore, in dictum,
the court indicated that the plaintiff might have been able to recover if
there had been some fraud, violence, or artifice other than mere solicitation.
The second case relied on by the Restatement is Martin v. Carbide Carbon
Chemicals Corp.8 2 The defendant corporation maintained a dispensary at
74. Deeds v. Strode, 6 Idaho 317, 55 P. 656 (1898); Hyatt v. McCoy, 194 N.C.
25, 138 S.E. 405 (1927); Oberlin v. Upson, 84 Ohio St. 111, 95 N.E. 511 (1911). If
the prostitute sues on a fraud theory rather than on a battery or seduction theory, the
same principle would apply and bar her action. Jekshewitz v. Groswald, 265 Mass. 413,
164 N.E. 609 (1929); De Vail v. Strunk, 96 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. App. 1936).
75. Oberlin v. Upson, 84 Ohio St. 111, 95 N.E. 511 (1911).
76. Lawyer v. Fritcher, 7 N.Y.S. 909 (Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 1889); Hyatt v. McCoy,
194 N.C. 25, 138 S.E. 405 (1927); Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9
(1974).
77. See cases cited in note 67 supra.
78. Hyatt v. McCoy, 194 N.C. 25, 138 S.E. 405 (1927).
79. Id.
80. RESTATEMENT, Appendix, upra note 52, § 57, at 67; RESTATEMENT, supra note
1, Explanatory Notes § 892B, Comment g, at 37.
81. 84 Ohio St. 111, 95 N.E. 511 (1911).
82. 184 Tenn. 166, 197 S.W.2d 798 (1946).
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its plant in Tennessee. Several of the doctors employed in the dispensary
were not licensed to practice medicine in Tennessee. Plaintiff, a dispen-
sary worker, injured herself, and she submitted to an examination by two
of the unlicensed defendant doctors. She brought suit against the corpora-
tion and the doctors on the theory that any touching by the doctors was
illegal because they were not licensed. There was no allegation of in-
competence or negligence. The court rejected the theory and affirmed a
dismissal of the complaint. The issue of consent was not discussed. It is
not even clear that the case involved fraudulently obtained consent. The
plaintiff's petition stated that the defendant corporation represented that
the doctors were "qualified physicians." However, the petition did not state
that at the time she submitted to the touching she believed the defendant
doctors to be licensed in Tennessee and relied on that belief. Since she was
employed in the dispensary, she may well have known where the doctors
were licensed. Therefore, it is not clear that the case raises the issue
under discussion.
However, even if the defendants had fraudulently induced the plaintiff
to believe that the defendant doctors were licensed in Tennessee, it is impos-
sible to determine whether this case supports the Restatement position.
There are several possible explanations for the holding, and the court did
not explain its decision. The authors of the Restatement presumably would
argue that the case involves fraud in the inducement since the plaintiff,
fully aware of the nature of the touching, consented because she thought
the doctors were licensed in Tennessee. The difficulty is that the case also
could be characterized as involving fraud in the factum. The Restatement
takes the position that a touching by a physician for medical reasons is not
offensive even though the same touching by a layman would be offensive.
s3
If this were true, it should follow that a touching by a licensed physician
is not offensive, but the same touching by an unlicensed charlatan is offen-
sive. Under this view the case involves fraud in the factum and is incon-
sistent with the Restatement rule. A third explanation of the case is that
whether a fully qualified medical doctor is technically licensed to practice
in the jurisdiction where the touching occurs is simply not important if it
is a proper touching for a proper purpose. If this is correct, the true basis
of the decision is that there was no misrepresentation of a material fact.
The Second Restatement recognizes that insubstantial mistakes will not
vitiate consent."
The Restatement rule that fraud in the inducement does not vitiate con-
sent is primarily applicable to cases involving harmless, offensive contacts.
83. RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, § 55, Comment b.
84. Consent to purchase an automobile in ignorance of a minor scratch on the
fender does not vitiate ,consent, but ignorance of the absence of a motor does. RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 1, § 892B, Comment f. Note that both of the above fact situations
involve fraud in the factum.
[Vol. 46
HeinOnline  -- 46 U. Cin. L. Rev. 86 1977
FRAUDULENi'LY INDUCED CONSENT
Here, the concept is so susceptible to manipulation that it has little value
as an analytical tool. In other areas where it is less subject to manipula-
tion (trespass, conversion, and batteries involving bodily harm) the distinc-
tion has no practical application because of the exceptions to the rule
which exclude most such cases. It may be that one rule cannot explain
all cases. However, under the Restatement approach it is normally as
easy to characterize fraudulently obtained consent to an offensive contact
as involving fraud in the factum as it is to characterize it as involving
fraud in the inducement. The rule is of no help; it is merely a statement
of conclusion. A better approach is to concentrate on the reasons for the
conclusion. Ironically, the courts have done precisely that. These civil
cases have been decided without the courts ever mentioning whether the
fraud is a matter of factum or a matter of inducement.
B. Trespass to Land Cases
The First Restatement of Torts, in section 173,85 recognized that fraudu-
lently obtained consent to enter land is always invalid. The inducement/
factum distinction was not applied. Common law fraud -requires a mis-
representation of a material fact or a failure to disclose a material fact if
there are special circumstances which justify a duty to disclose.86 A mate-
rial fact is one that a reasonable person would consider important.8 7  Ob-
viously, the First Restatement rule is broad enough to apply to cases in-
volving fraud in the inducement since such matters can be of material
significance. Illustration 1 of section 173 provides an example. There,
a surgeon is called to the plaintiff's house to attend her at the birth of a
child. The surgeon brings a companion, whose sole purpose in coming is
to satisfy his curiosity. The companion is a trespasser. The Illustration,
based on DeMay v. Roberts,88 involves fraud in the inducement. The
plaintiff consented to the companion's presence because she thought he
was the doctor's assistant, but would not have consented to the presence
of a stranger. Unlike battery cases, the identity of the companion does
not have an effect on the tortious nature of the act or on the interest that
is being invaded. It is true that the presence of a doctor's assistant may
85. RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § 173.
86. RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 551.
87. RESTATEMENT, supra note 37, § 538.
88. 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881). The theory of recovery in the case itself
is not clear. The petition contained three counts. The first count alleged assault. This
was probably really a battery based on a touching by the companion in the course of
the birth. Illustration 3 of § 55 of RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, is based on this
interpretation. RESTATEMENT, Appendix, supra note 52, § 55, at 65. The other two
counts are not specified. The court does say that the plaintiff had a right to privacy
and that no one had a right to intrude. The consent was no defense because it was
fraudulently obtained.
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not be offensive whereas the presence of a stranger is offensive, but this
is unimportant in trespass to land cases. The law of trespass does not
distinguish between offensive or harmful entries on the one hand and in-
nocuous entries on the other hand. Any unauthorized entry is a trespass.
The victim fully understood the nature of the legally protected interest
that was being invaded. However, the consent was vitiated because any
fraud, even fraud in the inducement, vitiates consent.
Professors Harper and James, in their treatise on the law of torts, agree
with the First Restatement. They recognize the inducement/factum dis-
tinction in battery cases, 9 but for trespass to land cases they merely state
that consent obtained by fraud is invalid. 0 Two of the cases that they
cite in support of this proposition involve fraud in the inducement. In
Knocke v. Pratt 1 the defendant excavated on the plaintiffs land in con-
junction with construction on the defendant's land. He obtained consent
to do this from the plaintiff's agent by representing to the agent that the
plaintiff had given consent. The court held that the agent's consent was
invalid because it was induced by the defendant's misrepresentation. This
is purely a case of fraud in the inducement. The agent fully comprehended
the nature of the defendant's entry on the land. The fraud merely related
to his reason for granting permission. In Gribben v. Carpenter9 2 the de-
fendant was the testamentary guardian of a minor who owned some real
property on which there was an oil well. The defendant leased the oil
and gas rights to a business in which he had an interest. He obtained the
orphan court's approval of the lease by misrepresenting his interest in the
transaction. Citing the First Restatement, the court held that the defend-
ant was a trespasser. The fraud here related solely to the orphan court's
inducement for approving the lease. That court was fully aware of the
nature of the entry.
The Second Restatement eliminated the black letter rule of section 173
and substituted a cross-reference to section 892B.93 This is the general
section dealing with consent induced by misrepresentation or mistake.9 4
This, in effect, changed the rule, since section 173 of the First Restatement
recognized that fraud in the inducement vitiates consent, but section 892B
of the Second Restatement provides that fraud in the inducement does not
vitiate consent.9 5 Section 173 of the Second Restatement contains the same
illustrations as are contained in section 173 of the First Restatement, in-
89. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 3, § 3.10.
90. Id. § 1.11, at 40.
91. 194 Mo. App. 300, 187 S.W. 578 (1916). See also Windle v. Crescent Pipe-
Line Co., 186 Pa. 224, 40 A. 310 (1898) (dictum) (a release to lay a pipeline on
plaintiff's land is invalid if obtained by fraud in the inducement).
92. 323 Pa. 243, 185 A. 712 (1936).
93. RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, § 173.
94. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 892B.
95. Id. Comment g.
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cluding the one based on DeMay v. Roberts." The retention of this illus-
tration creates an inconsistency because the result approved there could
not be reached by application of the rule in section 892B. The reporter's
notes to section 173 of the Second Restatement cite no authority for chang-
ing the rule.97 In fact, it appears that the change may have been inad-
vertent. The notes say that the section was changed by providing a mere
cross-reference to section 892B "to avoid duplication." 9 S The notes cite
with approval DeMay v. Roberts, Knocke v. Pratt, and Gribben v. Carpen-
ter,99 the only cases cited by the reporter. As mentioned above, all three
cases involved fraud in the inducement rather than fraud in the factum.
Even though the Second Restatement cites no authority for applying the
inducement/factum distinction to trespass cases, inquiry should be made
as to whether any exists. There are several cases that at first glance might
appear to indicate that consent to an entry to land is a defense even though
it has been induced by fraud. However, under close scrutiny none of the
cases really support this proposition. In Alexander v. Letson,100 a mortgage
held by the defendant on 80 acres of land was foreclosed. He -bought the
land at a foreclosure sale and took possession. Plaintiff, the former owner,
sued in equity to have the mortgage set aside for lack of consideration.
He prevailed and was put into possession by the court. He then sued for
trespass for damages to the land occurring during the time that the de-
fendant was in possession. The court held that an action for trespass to
land would not lie because a disseizin is required for trespass. 10 1 One
buying land at a foreclosure sale and taking possession has not committed
a disseizin because his entry is lawful. The case does not involve fraudu-
lently obtained consent. There was no fraud by the defendant, and the
plaintiff did not consent to the entry. Authority to enter the land was
obtained by purchasing it at the foreclosure sale. However, by way of
dictum, the court stated that an action for trespass "will not lie unless the
plaintiff's possession was intruded upon by the defendant without his con-
sent, even though consent may have been given under a mistake of facts,
or procured by fraud ...... 102 This dictum is not based on the proposi-
tion that consent induced by fraud is valid. Rather, the basis of the dictum
is the need for a disseizin, i.e., the wrongful ouster of one seized of a free-
hold estate in land. Thus, the case is similar to the cases holding that
there is no rape if there is no actual force. The basis of the dictum is a
failure to prove an essential element of the plaintiff's case (wrongful ouster)
rather than on a valid consent.
96. RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, § 173.
97. RESTATEMENT, Appendix, supra note 52, § 173, at 190.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 242 Ala. 488, 7 So. 2d 33 (1942).
101. id.
102. Id. at 492, 7 So. 2d at 36.
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In Kimball v. Custer 103 the defendant wanted to enter plaintiff's house
to repossess a piano, but could not gain admission because the plaintiff
kept it locked. One of the defendant's men gained admittance by pretend-
ing to be an insurance agent needing to examine the flues. After he
gained admittance, the defendant's other men approached the house. Plain-
tiff bolted the door and asked the supposed insurance agent to leave by
the back way. Instead, the impostor unbolted the door over plaintiff's
objection. The other men entered and took the piano. The court held
that the imposter became a trespasser when he unbolted the door against
the command of the plaintiff.
The impostor's misrepresentation that he was an insurance agent consti-
tuted fraud which was the plaintiff's inducement for permitting the entry.
One might argue that if fraud in the inducement really vitiates consent in
trespass cases, the court should have found that he was a trespasser from
the moment he entered rather than from the moment that he attempted
to unbolt the door. The court did not discuss this question. When the
trespass commenced was not important to the decision. Therefore, the case
does not provide much authority for the proposition that the impostor was
not a trespasser until he attempted to unbolt the door. If it does stand
for this proposition, it is clearly wrong. A person having permission to
enter for one purpose commits a trespass to land if he enters the land for
a different purpose.10 4  Trespass commences the moment he enters the
land.10 5  Since the impostor had permission to enter for the purpose of
inspecting the flues, he became a trespasser the moment he entered because
his entry was for a different purpose.
In Big Sandy & Kentucky River Railway Co. v. Rice 106 plaintiff sold a
right-of-way on his property to defendant railroad but kept his interest in
the apple trees located on the right-of-way. The contract provided that
the defendant would not cut down the apple tree unless necessary. The
railroad later decided to build a telephone line on the right-of-way. Its
employees were about to cut down four apple trees when the plaintiff
intervened. He claimed that it was not necessary because they could either
use taller poles or put the line on the other side of the track. The defend-
ant's vice president arrived and reached an agreement with the plaintiff.
The plaintiff claimed that the defendant agreed to pay for the trees, but
the vice president claimed that he agreed to pay only "if anything was
due him." 107 After this accord was reached the plaintiff helped to cut
down the apple trees. The company refused to pay, and the plaintiff sued
103. 73111. 389 (1874).
104. Kent County Agricultural Soc'y v. Ide, 128 Mich. 423, 87 N.W. 369 (1901);
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 892A, Comment g, at 26.
105. See note 104 supra.
106. 206 Ky. 128, 266 S.W. 1049 (1924).
107. Id.
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for trespass to the four apple trees. The court held that he could not sue
on a trespass theory because the cutting was not done against his will and
consent. He agreed to it and helped cut them down. The court recognized
that he had a cause of action for breach of contract to pay for the trees
and remanded for trial on that issue.
This case is not authority for the proposition that fraud in the induce-
ment does not vitiate consent. In the first place, there was no finding that
the railroad's vice president acted fraudulently. There was no resolution
at this stage of the proceedings as to what the vice president promised or
as to whether he intended to keep the promise at the time he made it.
Whether he acted with fraud is irrelevant because there could be no tres-
pass on the land under Kentucky law as it existed at the time of the deci-
sion. The early common law imposed strict liability for trespass to land.
Neither intent to enter nor negligence was required. 10 8 What the cause of
action did require was a forcible and direct interference as opposed to an
indirect entry.'0 9 The modem cause of action for trespass requires fault,
either intentional or negligent conduct."" The law no longer distinguishes
between direct interferences and indirect interferences."' Until 1956 Ken-
tucky courts recognized the trespass cause of action in its ancient form.112
A trespasser was held strictly liable for any entry he caused, but only if
the force was direct and immediate.1' 8 Fraudulently inducing a third
person to interfere with the plaintiff's property constituted an indirect inter-
ference." 4  In such cases, trespass will not lie; rather, plaintiff must sue
in trespass on the case.
Howe v. State "5 was a prosecution for a criminal trespass. The defendant
took possession of land pursuant to a written agreement and removed trees
from the land. He had procured the contract by fraud. Sufficient facts
are not given in the opinion to determine whether it was fraud in the
factum or fraud in the inducement. The court held that there was no
108. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 7.
109. Id.; HARPER & JAMES, supra note 3, § 1.3, at 9.
110. PRossER, supra note 2, § 7.
Ill. Id.
112. 46 Ky. L.J. 187, 188-89 (1957).
113. Louisville Ry. v. Sweeney, 157 Ky. 620, 163 S.W. 739 (1914). This was
the leading Kentucky case imposing strict liability for trespass to land in Kentucky
until it was overruled by Randall v. Shelton, 293 S.W.2d 559 (1956). 46 Ky. L.J. 187,
188 (1957). In Sweeney the defendant's streetcar left its track and knocked over a
telephone pole which struck a gate in the plaintiff's yard. The gate in turn struck the
plaintiff and injured her. The court obviously was concerned with whether the injury
was directly inflicted, thus making trespass the appropriate form of action. It relied on
Scott v. Shepard 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (K.B. 1773) in resolving this question in favor of
the plaintiff. This is the famous "squib case" that established criteria for distinguishing
between direct injuries and indirect injuries.
114. HARPEn & JAMEs, supra note 3, § 2.3, at 107.
115. 10 Ind. 492 (1858).
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criminal liability for trespass. The basis of the opinion was a public policy
against holding a man "liable to prosecutions for acts committed whilst
in the possession of lands under contracts declared fraudulent at the end
of a long and doubtful lawsuit . ... -116 Thus, the basis of the decision
is not validity of consent but rather an unrelated public policy. This is
similar to the cases imposing no liability because of the principle prohibit-
ing a person from profiting from his own wrong.
Had this been an action for civil damages the result would have been
different. When trees valuable for their lumber are removed from another's
land, the owner has the option to sue for conversion rather than for tres-
pass.117  As pointed out above," 8 fraudulently obtained consent to the
transfer of possession of a chattel is no bar to an action for conversion,
even if the fraud relates solely to a matter of inducement. Therefore, the
case is not relevant to the question of civil liability. The policy basis for
refusing to impose criminal liability would not apply in a civil action for
trespass to land. Otherwise, the defendant could acquire title by adverse
possession before the statute of limitations has expired.
There is no authority for the position of the Second Restatement that the
inducement/factum distinction applies to trespass cases. The three cases
that raise this issue hold the opposite. Section 892 of the Second Restate-
ment offers illustration 10 as its sole support for applying the inducement/
factum distinction to trespass cases. In this illustration the defendant buys
land from the plaintiff knowing that there is oil under the land. He pays
a low price because the plaintiff does not know about the oil. He enters
the land and takes possession. The Restatement states that he is not liable
for trespass. Concededly, there is no liability, but not because the fraud-
ulently obtained consent is valid. Rather, the result is correct because
there simply is no fraud in this case. The existence of oil under the land
is a material fact. However, the buyer made no misrepresentation with
respect to the presence of oil. He had no duty to disclose its existence
because there was no special relationship between himself and the seller,
and the fact was not basic to the transaction." 9
C. Situations Where Liability is Not Imposed for
Policy Reasons Unrelated to the Question of Consent
Kidnapping cases sometimes present the issue of fraudulently obtained
consent. While there is great variation in the statutory language used,
kidnapping is basically "a false imprisonment aggravated by conveying the
imprisoned person to some other place." 120 Although at common law actual
116. Id. at 493.
117. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 3, § 1.8, at 27.
118. See notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text.
119. RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 551, Illustrations 4, 6-8.
120. State v. Gough, 257 N.C. 348, 352, 126 S.E.2d 118, 121 (1962).
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force was required, 121 many courts now have abandoned this requirement.122
Consent of the victim to be taken away is a defense, but fraud, including
fraud in the inducement, vitiates consent. Thus, decoying the victim away
frorn home on the pretext of taking her to a babysitting job 123 or to the
woods to see the squirrels 124 constitutes kidnapping.
In People v. DeLeon 125 the victim agreed to go to Panama to work for
Madam DeBlen as a governess. Prior to her arrival she discovered that
Madam DeBlen ran a house of prostitution and that she was to be employed
there as a prostitute. Upon learning this she returned home. The defendant
was convicted of kidnapping. The victim's consent to be transported to
Panama was vitiated by fraud.'26 Two years later a court in the samejurisdiction decided People v. Fitzpatrick.127 Defendant induced the victim
to go to Mexico on the representation that he would be employed at
the rate of thirty-five American dollars per month, plus board. Upon
arrival, the victim discovered that the job paid one Mexican dollar per
day and no board. After working there for two weeks and finding the
arrangement unprofitable because of the high cost of food, the victim
returned to the United States. The court held that the defendant was
not guilty of kidnapping. It distinguished the DeLeon case on the basis
that there the defendant intended to withhold honest employment and
force the plaintiff into prostitution. Here, the victim received the honest
employment which he was promised. The misrepresentation related only
to the amount of wages.
Both cases involve fraud in the inducement. Both victims were fully
aware of the nature of the trip they were taking from New York to Latin
America. The fraud merely related to the reason for taking the voyage.
Why should fraud in the inducement invalidate consent in one case but
not in the other? One thoughtful author suggests that the issue is to be
resolved first, by looking at the purpose underlying the statute or common
law doctrine imposing liability and second, by deciding why consent is
recognized as a defense in such cases.1'2 8 The gravamen of the offense of
kidnapping is an unlawful interference with the freedom of the person
kidnapped.1'2 Forcing one to work against one's will as a prostitute is
a sufficient interference with personal liberty to warrant imposition of the
121. State v. Murphy, 280 N.C. 1, 184 S.E.2d 845 (1971).
122. See cases collected in Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 450 (1964). This is true even where
the statute requires force. E.g., Moody v. People, 20 IM. 316 (1858).
123. State v. Cough, 257 N.C. 348, 126 S.E.2d 118 (1962).
124. State v. Murphy, 280 N.C. 1, 184 S.E.2d 845 (1971).
125. 109 N.Y. 226, 16 N.E. 46 (1888).
126. Id.; accord, Beyer v. New York, 86 N.Y. 369 (1881).
127. 10 N.Y.S. 629 (Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 1890).
128. Comment, Consent, Liability and Guilt: A Study in Judicial Method, 7 STAN.
L. REv. 507, 515 (1955).
129. State v. Cough, 257 N.C. 348, 126 S.E.2d 118 (1962).
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punishment imposed by the kidnapping statute, while tricking one into
working for lower wages than anticipated is not. The defendant was
held not guilty in People v. Fitzpatrick because the statute was not
designed to prohibit his conduct. It is perfectly reasonable for the State
of New York to decide to punish the one type of conduct but not the
other. On this basis the cases are readily distinguishable.
Logically, the issue of fraudulently obtained consent could arise in the
context of the false imprisonment case. For example, the plaintiff might
agree to remain in a locked room in exchange for a counterfeit twenty-
dollar bill or because of the defendant's misrepresentation that this is
necessary for the plaintiff's personal safety. Apparently the only case
involving such fraud is Payson v. Macomber.30 Plaintiff, the mistress of
one party to a divorce action, was induced by the defendant to leave,
town and go to Salem so that she would be unavailable to testify in the
divorce case. Defendant induced her to do this by falsely representing that
she could be prosecuted and by paying her expenses. She went to Salem
but returned when she learned that she could not be prosecuted. The
court held that here was no false imprisonment because there was no
force or threat of force sufficient to constitute false imprisonment.' 3 ' Thus,
the holding is based on the absence of an element of the tort rather than
on the proposition that there was a valid consent. Since a genuine threat
of criminal prosecution does not constitute the type of force required for
false imprisonment, it follows that a fraudulent threat of such prosecution
also should not be sufficient. 13 2
The Payson v. Macomber requirement of force or threatened force may
be desirable in view of the interest that is being protected by the false
imprisonment cause of action. Where physical harm does not occur, the
false imprisonment cause of action protects the "dignitary interest in feel-
ing free to choose one's own location." 13 Thus, at least if the plaintiff
is unharmed, he has no cause of action arising out of the confinement
which he does not discover until after the confinement has ended.1M
The law is designed to protect the plaintiff from the mental disturbance
experienced from being aware of a present confinement 3 5 It does not
130. 85 Mass. 69 (1861).
131. Id. The court did not discuss this issue, but there apparently was no confine-
ment in this case. Plaintiff merely was induced to leave her home for a time. Exclusion
from a specified area, such as 'a city, does not constitute confinement. RESTATEMENT,
supra note 30, § 36.
132. See People v. Cavanaugh, 30 Cal. App. 432, 158 P. 1053 (1916) (defendant
pretending to be a police officer and threatening arrest unless victim consent to inter-
course is not guilty of rape if victim submits because arrest is not the type of force
required for rape).
133. RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, § 35, Comment h, at 53.
134. RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, § 42.
135. Id. Comment a.
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protect the affront to dignity arising upon the discovery that one, in the
past, had been confined without one's knowledge. 36 The affront to dignity
in this type of situation is indistinguishable from that which would occur
in the situation where the plaintiff permits himself to be locked in a
room to avoid some supposed danger, and upon his release learns that
there was no danger at all. Courts may disagree as to the type of interest
that the false imprisonment action will protect.13 7  However, if a court
agrees with the above-mentioned statement of the interest being protected,
then there is no reason to impose liability in the example where plaintiff
consents to confinement because of the misrepresentation. This is not
because the consent is valid. It is because the policy underlying the false
imprisonment cause of action cannot be furthered by permitting the
plaintiff to recover. Thus, it makes sense to require actual force or a
threat of force as an element of a false imprisonment cause of action
and yet not require actual force or a threat of force for other torts, since
the interests being protected by the various causes of action are different.
The history of the force requirement in rape cases is a good illustration.
Under the early English law rape was a capital offense. Judges adopted
a very restrictive definition of rape, requiring actual force or threats of
force, because other conduct simply was not deserving of the extremely
harsh penalty.18 Defendants perpetrating the grossest fraud in order to
obtain the consent of the victim were not guilty of rape because the
element of force was missing. 13 9 This rationale could be applied to cases
of fraud in the factum as well as to cases of fraud in the inducement.1 40
As the penalty for rape was reduced, the courts evolved a broader
definition of rape which did not always require actual force. Thus, it
became possible to commit rape by using fraud in certain instances.14 1
If the gravamen of the offense of rape in a particular jurisdiction includes
violence or a serious risk of violence in addition to an affront to the victim's
136. Id.
137. Cf. Wanzer v. Bright, 52 Ill. 35 (1869). Defendant enticed plaintiff into thejurisdiction by sending him a phony letter signed by a fictitious person. Plaintiff was
arrested upon his arrival. The court held that the arrest was illegal because of the
use of fraud to induce plaintiff to enter the jurisdiction. It reasoned that defendant
would be liable if he used force to bring plaintiff into the jurisdiction and that the in-
jury and outrage to the plaintiff is the same when fraud is used.
138. Koh, Consent and Responsibility in Sexual Offenses (pts. 1-2), 1968 Cnmi. L.
REv. (Eng.) 81, 150.
139. Id. at 88; Hortensius, supra note 64, at 857-58; Puttkammer, supra note 41,
at 414.
140. E.g., Regina v. Stanton, 174 Eng. Rep. 872 (Q.B. 1844). The defendant doctor
had intercourse with the victim under the pretext of giving her an injection. The court
held that the defendant could not be guilty of rape because he did not use force or
intend to use force in the event that the fraud failed. This is clearly a case of fraud in
the factum since the victim did not know that intercourse was about to occur.
141. Koh, supra note 138.
1977]
HeinOnline  -- 46 U. Cin. L. Rev. 95 1977
CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
dignity, 142 it makes sense not to apply the statute to the sham-marriage
cases. 143 The threat of violence is simply not present. The husband-imper-
sonation cases fall between the typical rape case and the sham-marriage
case. Actual duress is not involved, but there is a threat of violence erupt-
ing if the victim discovers the fraud in the course of the act. Whether rape
should apply to this situation is a question of social policy. A number of
jurisdictions have provided by statute that husband-impersonation consti-
tutes rape.1'44
Cases involving the crime of joy-riding, i.e., taking a car without the
consent of the owner, are also illustrations of the principle. Joy-riding is
similar to the crime of larceny, except that the defendant need not intend
to deprive the owner of the property permanently.145 While some courts
hold that a defendant can commit this crime by fraudulently inducing
the owner to part with possesion,' 46 other courts have held that fraud
does not -vitiate consent in these cases. 47  These later courts interpret
joy-riding statutes as punishing only those people who take automobiles
without acquiescence. 48  Such statutes are not designed to punish people
who obtain consent with fraudulent misrepresentations. 49  Other statutes
prohibit fraud of this sort.' 50 It is recognized that in other areas of the
142. Comment, Consent, Liability and Guilt: A Study in Judicial Method, 7 STA.
L. REv. 507, 515 (1955).
143. See note 66 supra.
144. Puttkammer, supra note 41, at 59-60.
145. Shope v. State, 18 Md. App. 472, 307 A.2d 730 (1973).
146. Id.
147. People v. Donell, 32 Cal. App. 3d 613, 108 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1973); People
v. Cook, 228 Cal. App. 2d 716, 39 Cal. Rptr. 802 (1964); State v. Boggs, 181 Iowa
358, 164 N.W. 759 (1917); State v. Malarkey, 195 Wis. 549, 218 N.W. 809 (1928).
148. People v. Cook, 228 Cal. App. 2d 716, 39 Cal. Rptr. 802 (1964); State v.
Mularkey, 195 Wis. 549, 218 N.W. 809 (1928).
149. See cases cited note 148 supra.
150. People v. Cook, 228 Cal. App. 716, 39 Cal. Rptr. 802 (1964). This case purports
to apply the fraud in the inducement vs. fraud in the factum distinction. For that
reason it will be discussed in detail. The defendant participated in a scheme whereby
one Satchell, impersonating the defendant, traded in defendant's car on a newer car.
Satchell took possession of the newer car in defendant's name and gave the dealer a
bad check for the balance due. The court held that defendant could not be guilty
of violating the joy-riding statute since the dealer consented to relinquish possession.
The court reasoned that the statute was not designed to punish one obtaining consent
by misrepresentation. The court distinguished People v. Perez, 203 Cal. App. 2d
397, 21 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1962), in which the defendant obtained a car under the
false representation that he had a buyer for it. He was given three days to make
the sale. The defendant actually had no buyer, but kept the car for his own use.
He was convicted of violating the joy-riding statute. The court in Cook distinguished
Perez by saying that Perez involved fraud in the factum since the owner did not
intend for the defendant to acquire possession for his own use. The fraud in Cook
related merely to the inducement since the owner intended to sell the defendant the
car and consented to his taking possession of it.
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law fraud vitiates consent, but this theory does not apply to joy-riding
cases because of legislative intent.15 1
These cases are not analogous tort cases because a defendant who
fraudulently obtains possession of an automobile is liable for trespass to
chattels or for conversion in situations involving fraud in the inducement.
152
However, they do illustrate a valid method of resolving the criminal issue
with which they are concerned. Assume the defendant fraudulently
obtains possession of the plaintiff's car by giving him counterfeit money.
There is nothing wrong with holding him civilly liable to the plaintiff
for conversion in one action and not holding him criminally liable for
joy-riding in another action. In view of the gravamen of the offense of
joy-riding it is reasonable to adopt a special definition of consent which
will more fully carry out the policy underlying the statute.
A similar situation can arise in the tort context. Fischer v. Market
Ford Sales, Inc.'5 involved a civil suit against the owner of a motor
The distinction appears fallacious since the victim in Cook gave the car to
Satchell, thinking that Satchell was the defendant. Therefore, he did not really
intend for defendant to have the car. Even so, the distinction appears to be
irrelevant. The victims in both cases knew that they were permanently relinquishing
possession of their respective cars. They were both mistaken in believing that they
would be paid. From the victim's point of view it makes no difference whether the
defendant keeps the car or gives it to a third person.
People ov. Cook is a good illustration of the manipulative nature of the inducement/
factum distinction. The court reasons that fraud is collateral and does not vitiate
consent if the victim is fully aware of the nature of the act. By broadly or narrowly
defining the nature of the act the court can manipulate the result. The court reasoned
that Perez involved fraud in the factum because the victim did not intend that the
defendant acquire possession of the car "for his own use." The opposite result could
have been reached by reasoning that the fraud was collateral because the victim knew
that he was permanently relinquishing possession of the car, aid this is all he must
know in order to give a valid consent. Here, the nature of the act is narrowly defined
to include only knowledge that possession is being transferred. Cook is the only
criminal case the author found employing the inducement/factum distinction. In
addition, People v. Hutchings, 242 Cal. App. 2d 294, 51 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1966),
another joy-riding case, mentions the concept of fraud in the inducement in reference
to Cook. As discussed in the text accompanying notes 145-52, these joy-riding
cases are not valid tort analogies since the defendants in these cases would clearly
be liable for conversion.
The only civil cases the author found using the inducement/factum distinction
involve the liability of a maker of a negotiable instrument to a holder in due course.
The maker is liable if the note was procured by fraud in the inducement. He is
not liable if the note was procured by fraud in the factum, e.g., the maker was
unaware of the nature of the document he signed. E.g., United States v. Klatt, 135
F. Supp. 648 (S.D. Cal. 1955); Gate City Nat'l Bank v. Bunton, 316 Mo. 1338, 296
S.W. 375 (1927). These cases are not valid tort analogies. The payee of the note
is clearly liable to the maker in tort. The rule is merely one of contract adjusting
the equities between two innocent parties.
151. People v. Donell, 32 Cal. App. 3d 613, 108 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1973).
152. See notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text.
153. 225 N.W.2d 370 (Minn. 1974).
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vehicle under a statute which rendered him vicariously liable for the
negligence of anyone driving his car with his consent. The defendant
was a used car dealer who consented to let an individual take a car
for a short test drive. The individual turned out to be an ex-convict
who kept the car for 22 days prior to having an accident in which the
plaintiff was injured. The defendant used car dealer did not report the
theft until after the accident. Defendant argued that he was not liable
under the statute because his consent was vitiated by fraud. The court
rejected the argument on policy grounds in view of the large number
of auto dealers lending vehicles to prospective buyers.154  The court held
that the dealer would remain liable until he withdraws consent by taking
reasonable measures to recover the car. The decision is entirely reasonable.
The purpose of such a statute is to induce car dealers to lend vehicles to
responsible drivers or be prepared to pay the costs of the accident. This
policy is unrelated to the question of an attempt by the tortfeasor to
cheat the owner. The court furthered the policy by not permitting fraud
to vitiate consent. But that does not mean that fraud never vitiates
consent. The court recognized that the ex-convict was a converter. In
an action by the car dealer against the ex-convict for conversion or for
trespass to chattels, consent would be no defense.
III. CONCLUSION
The doctrine that fraud in the factum vitiates consent but fraud in the
inducement does not originated as an attempt to explain a line of cases
that did not need explaining. Courts have decided cases involving
fraudulently obtained consent without reference to this doctrine.
In cases involving offensive contacts, the distinction is illusory because
most such contacts can readily be characterized as involving either fraud
in the facturn or fraud in the inducement. In this area it is a distinction
without a difference and certainly no aid to analysis. At best it is a mere
statement of conclusion. At worst, it could become a substitute for analysis.
A judge who is not fully aware of the manipulative nature of the test
could decide a case wrongly by concentrating on issues that have no
bearing on the problem. It is better for courts to consciously focus on
the issues involved.
In other types of cases the result is less subject to manipulation. In
cases involving seduction, kidnapping, trespass to land, trespass to chattels,
and conversion there is often a clear distinction between fraud in the
inducement and fraud in the factum. Courts have recognized that fraud
in the inducement vitiates consent in many such cases. However, the
recognized exceptions to the supposed general rule do not cover all of
154. Id.
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these situations. Therefore, even given the extreme flexibility of the rule,
it is not an accurate statement of the law.
In reality, fraud has almost always been held to vitiate consent. It
does not matter whether the case involves fraud in the factum or fraud
in the inducement. Cases involving fraud where the plaintiff has not
been permitted to recover are not based on the validity of the plaintiff's
consent. In some of them there has been a failure of the plaintiff to
prove an essential element of the case, e.g., lack of force in a rape case.
In others, the plaintiff was barred from recovery by some overriding
policy, e.g., seduction cases prohibiting the plaintiff from profiting from
her own wrong 15a In some special cases the validity of a fraudulently
obtained consent has been determined by looking to the policy to be
furthered by the crime or theory of recovery and seeing whether that
policy would be impaired by invalidating the consent. Thus, a particular
fact situation can give rise to a consent that is valid for some purposes
but not for others. This treatment is fully justified. The consent issue
arises in an enormous variety of cases. Whether it should be recognized
as a defense in one case may be governed by policy considerations that
have no place in other cases. Each case must be treated individually.
155. Another example of this is found in Thibault v. Lalumiere, 318 Mass. 72, 60
N.E.2d 349 (1945). The court held that submission to a sexual touching because of a
misrepresentation of intent to marry the plaintiff does not constitute battery. Consent is
a defense. A fraudulent promise to marry does not vitiate consent because the "Heart
Balm" statute abolishes the right to sue for breach of contract to marry. Where the only
ground for contending that the touching constituted a wrong was defendant's intent
not to fulfill his promise, the wrong is directly attributable to the breach of contract
and not actionable.
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